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Abstract
The rural areas of the United States have experienced a proliferation of quasigovernmental institutions over the past three decades. The formation of such
institutions represents an important form of local boundary change. Local boundaries
determine service delivery, economic development, and intergovernmental
relationships. It remains unclear, though, how the process of boundary change
unfolds. Using federal and state data, I examine the ability of four general
explanations of boundary change to account for the proliferation of economic
development corporations across North Dakota and South Dakota. I find that their
creation is not driven by economic change or need, but is more associated with
property taxes per capita.

Introduction
State and local governments want to create an environment that encourages new business
investments, but they are leery of implementing developmental policies that would increase the
general tax burden. This desire for economic growth at a low public cost has led to the
proliferation of quasi-governmental institutions, which typically fund themselves through some
means other than a direct tax upon all citizens (Sagalyn 2007)1. Previously esoteric entities such
as business improvement districts have become commonplace (Morcol and Zimmerman 2006)2,
nearly every state allows the creation of tax increment financing districts to promote private
development (Byrne 2006)3, and the proliferation of dependent and independent special districts
continues at a rapid pace (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2002)4. States have also greatly expanded
the use of enterprise zones and tax abatement programs in hopes of attracting economic growth
to their most distressed areas (Greenbaum 2004)5.
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One of the most prevalent quasi-governmental institutions to arise in recent years is the
economic development corporation. Legal definitions vary by state, but economic development
corporations (EDCs) are generally non-profit corporations organized and overseen by
representatives of business, local government, and the public (Wisconsin State Code 2006)6 in
hopes of improving the economic situation of a specific municipality (Texas State Code 2006)7
or region (Kansas State Code 2006)8. EDCs pursue such strategies as publicizing local business
opportunities, providing low-interest loans to businesses, encouraging new employment
opportunities, making previously-neglected neighborhoods more attractive, and creating regional
development plans. EDCs are funded through a number of sources, including membership dues
and contributions from participating businesses and governments (North Dakota State Century
Code 2008)9, income derived from loan payments and service charges (New Mexico State Code
2006)10, and the implementation of specially designated sale taxes (Texas State Code 2006)11.
Logically, the creation of quasi-governmental institutions such as business improvement districts
and economic development corporations should be driven by local need. Depressed areas with
inadequate tax bases are the natural beneficiaries of such institutions. However, the available
research suggests caution before accepting this conclusion (Greenbaum 2004)12. Indeed, Burns
(1994)13 presents evidence that new governmental institutions are often created by private
entrepreneurs seeking to benefit themselves rather than the general public. Focusing upon the
formation of cities and special districts, Burns asserts that entrepreneurs who successfully
instigate and complete the process of incorporation are well-positioned to institutionalize their
own values within the new unit, such as a predilection for low taxes or the provision of certain
services. These findings serve as a basis for the subsequent study of local boundary change
(Foster 199714; Feiock and Carr 200115).
Unfortunately, the U.S. Bureau of the Census excludes economic development corporations from
its Census of Governments tabulations and only a few states follow their day-to-day activities.
As a result, academic research regarding EDCs remains quite limited (Olberding 2002)16. This
study seeks to derive a better understanding of economic development corporations through an
examination of their uneven proliferation across North Dakota and South Dakota. These two
states have been selected for analysis due to their limited governmental resources as well as the
stark contrast between the economic prospects of their rural counties versus their more urban
counties. Both states also experienced a rapid growth in EDC numbers at nearly the same time.
The study uses negative binomial distributions to test whether economic conditions drove EDC
proliferation during the 1980s and 1990s or if other, more political, considerations were at work.
The study relies upon local boundary change theory to give shape to its analysis.
Explanations for Local Boundary Change
A theoretical perspective that focuses upon the boundaries of local governments may seem rather
narrow until one realizes that “...boundaries determine who is included within a jurisdiction and
define local arrangements of service provision and production, patterns of economic
development, and the exercise of political power” (Feiock and Carr 2001, 383)17. From this
2
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perspective, then, it is the shared or overlapping boundaries between governments that set the
initial parameters for intergovernmental relationships within a county or metropolitan area. One
government‟s sudden decision to extend its boundaries represents not just an expansion of its
service delivery responsibilities and tax base, but a noteworthy projection of political power as
well. Likewise, the creation of a new government or quasi-governmental organization alters the
local equilibrium. Other governments may react by reevaluating their relationships with one
another or creating their own quasi-governmental organizations, which can lead to the eventual
transformation of the local political system itself (Perrenod 198418; Burns 199419). Exactly how
this process unfolds, though, is not always clear.
Examples of boundary change include: the incorporation of a new city, county, township, special
district, or other governmental unit (McCabe 200020; Thurmaier and Wood 200421); the
annexation of unincorporated land by a pre-existing government (Brierly 2004)22; the
consolidation of two or more governments into a single unit (Feiock and Carr 2000)23; and the
legal dissolution of redundant governments (Carr 2004)24. Typically, boundary change requires
a concerted effort by public and private actors, as well as some involvement by the local
electorate.
The literature provides four explanations for the extent and frequency of local boundary change.
The first explanation asserts that economic and demographic change will produce a demand for
additional public services. These service demands can be met by expanding the size of those
local governments already responsible for service delivery, having municipalities annex any
needy areas (Bollens 1961)25, incorporating new general-purpose governments to provide a
complete range of services (Burns 1994)26, or forming special districts and quasi-governmental
institutions to offer specific services as required (Smith 196827; Walsh 197828; Nelson 199029;
Foster 199730).
The second explanation claims that state-imposed restrictions upon general-purpose governments
can both encourage and discourage boundary change. Indeed, research indicates that state limits
upon the ability of municipalities to impose property taxes (MacManus 1981)31 and create public
debt (Sbragia 1996)32 sparked the proliferation of special districts during the 1950s and 1960s as
local politicians created new districts to circumvent state restrictions and fund additional
services. There is also evidence of a positive relationship between state limits upon the power of
municipalities to annex unincorporated areas and the number of special districts within a state
(Heikkila and Ely 2003)33. Under such limitations, unincorporated areas requiring additional
government services cannot expect that their needs will be met via annexation by an already
established municipality. These areas are forced into forming additional special districts to
alleviate their service demands.
The third explanation proclaims that the creation of governmental units and other such boundary
change is not merely an automatic response to economic and demographic fluctuations (Burns
1994)34. Instead, boundary change is often a political act intended to directly benefit a specific
group of entrepreneurs. This explanation notes that any group which instigates and successfully
3
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completes the process of incorporation is positioned to institutionalize their values within that
new government, such as low taxes or the provision and exclusion of certain services. Given
these benefits, one would expect an unending series of competitions between various public and
private actors to create additional governmental institutions. However, the formation of a new
government is not easily done. Indeed, incorporation is often an expensive, time-consuming task
with considerable risk of failure (Feiock and Carr 2000)35. Most actors are better off waiting for
someone else to assume this burden, since they will ultimately share in the general benefits
provided by a new government anyway. Such circumstances create a conundrum: while it is
rational for actors to wait, this also ensures that no one actually attempts to incorporate a new
government.
One solution to this paralysis requires an entrepreneur with substantial resources to take on the
costs associated with government formation (Burns 1994)36. Such entrepreneurs are undaunted
by the prospect of a costly failure and sees the possible institutionalization of their values as a
terrific selective benefit. The identification of such entrepreneurs is a source of considerable
interest to researchers. Burns emphasizes the role played by real-estate developers and industrial
manufacturers in bringing about boundary change while Schneider, Teske and Mintrom (1995)37,
McCabe (2000)38, and Feiock and Carr (2000)39 stress the importance of „public entrepreneurs.‟
McCabe notes that “...public entrepreneurs – including those who work in universities, civic
associations, and business – have been identified as having an interest in changing the existing
local structure for delivering services” (2000, 124)40. The creation of a new government is seen
as one way of bringing about such change.
The fourth explanation emphasizes the ways in which an initial instance of boundary change can
reverberate throughout the local political system and cause other governments to change their
own boundaries. These reactions are often done in imitation of the initial boundary change, but
can have a preemptive or defensive element as well. For example, Burns (1994)41 described the
relationship between the passage of state laws encouraging municipal annexation and the
subsequent proliferation of newly incorporated municipalities. She noted that “...where
annexation was legal, and citizens thus had reason to worry about being annexed to existing
cities with higher taxes” (1994, 80)42, citizens were likely to engage in „defensive‟ incorporations
to prevent any unwanted takeovers. Bauroth (2005)43 found a similar „defensive‟ dynamic
amongst neighboring boroughs in Pennsylvania with the introduction of the municipal authority
format during the 1940s.
Economic Development Corporations in North Dakota and South Dakota
The creation of an economic development corporation in North Dakota – known legally as a
„certified nonprofit development corporation‟ – is a relatively straightforward legal process
(North Dakota Century Code 2008, 10-33-124)44. Any number of North Dakota residents can
come together and file articles of incorporation with the secretary of state‟s office. These articles
specify the corporation name, the nature of its business, the principal place where it will transact
that business, the names of its officers and directors, and the means through which the
4

The Online Journal of Rural Research and Policy

Issue 5: August 25, 2008

corporation will be governed. To qualify as a „certified nonprofit development corporation,‟ the
incorporators must also provide a statement that the corporation “...has adopted a resolution to
invest a majority of membership payments, dues, or contributions received in primary sector
businesses” (North Dakota Century Code 2008, 10-33-124-2c)45. This statement allows a new
corporation considerable discretion as to how it will actually encourage economic development.
Most corporations, though, engage in such activities as offering low-interest loans to new
businesses, marketing the local economy to outside business interests, and overseeing employee
training programs. However, none of the corporation‟s income can be distributed directly to its
members or governing officers.
Certified nonprofit development corporations can receive income from a variety of public and
private sources, but they generally rely upon the Certified Nonprofit Development Corporation
Investment Credit for funding (North Dakota Office of State Tax Commissioner 2008)46. The
state allows an income tax credit of up to $2,000 to any individual, estate, trust, or corporation
that buys a membership, pays dues, or otherwise contributes funds to a certified nonprofit
development corporation (North Dakota Century Code 2008, 10-33-124-4)47.
This study searched the North Dakota secretary of state‟s corporate registration records (2008)48
to derive a list of all nonprofit corporations engaged in economic development activities, as well
as their years of incorporation and central locations. The corporations under examination here
focus their efforts on areas less than the size of a county, typically cities and townships. All
nonprofit corporations devoted to low-income housing, though, were excluded from the
analysis. The data is illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1: New Economic Development Corporations in North Dakota by Year
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As can be seen, 109 nonprofit economic development corporations formed between 1946 and
2006 in 44 of the state‟s 53 counties. The creation of such corporations was once a rare event
with only 15 EDCs incorporating between 1946 and 1969. Twelve more corporations formed
between 1970 and 1979, and an addition 23 EDCs between 1980 and 1989. However, 1989
marked a transition point with the creation of 5 EDCs. The next year brought 14 new
corporations, with a total of 46 corporations forming between 1990 and 1999.
The incorporation of an economic development corporation in South Dakota is also an
uncomplicated legal process (South Dakota Codified Laws 2008, 47-22)49. Three or more South
Dakota residents can file articles of incorporation of a non-profit corporation with the secretary
of state‟s office. These articles specify the corporation name, the nature of its business, the place
where it will transact that business, its officers, and the means through which the corporation will
be governed.
However, most non-profits devoted to economic development are actually incorporated as what
the state code calls „local industrial development corporations.‟ These corporations are
specifically “...formed for the purpose of furthering the economic development of a community
and its environs, and with authority to promote and assist in the growth and development of
small business concerns in the areas covered by its operation.” (South Dakota Codified Laws
2008, 7-29-24)50. Incorporating as an industrial development corporation offers a number of
benefits to a non-profit, such as: exemptions from local property taxes and certain state taxes;
exemptions from certain fees and bonding requirements; and a formalized process of leasing
property from a county (South Dakota Codified Laws 2008, Chapter 5)51. Perhaps the most
important benefit, though, is that the state and local governments perceive industrial
development corporations as legitimate partners in developing the local economy. This is a level
of respect that regular non-profit corporations devoted to civic improvements do not necessarily
receive.
This study also searched the South Dakota secretary of state‟s corporate registration records
(2008)52 to tabulate a list of nonprofit corporations engaged in economic development activities,
as well as their years of incorporation and central locations. These corporations focused their
efforts on areas less than the size of a county, typically cities or a portion of the county. The data
is illustrated in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: New Economic Development Corporations in South Dakota by Year.

Figure 2 shows that 147 economic development corporations formed between 1946 and 2006 in
60 of the state‟s 66 counties. The creation of such corporations used to be a relatively rare event
with just 22 EDCs incorporating between 1946 and 1969. Thirty-one more corporations formed
between 1970 and 1979, with an addition 36 EDCs between 1980 and 1989. However, 1986
marked a transition point with the creation of 7 EDCs. Finally, a total of 40 corporations formed
between 1990 and 1999.
Explanations for the Uneven Proliferation of Economic Development Corporations in
North Dakota and South Dakota: Model and Hypotheses
The dependent variables in this study are the total number of economic development
corporations created in North Dakota and South Dakota during the periods of 1987 – 1992 and
1992 – 1997. The study tests the extent to which the four general explanations for boundary
change can account for the uneven proliferation of EDCs within the various local political
systems. Thus, the study is not so much concerned in why a specific, individual EDC arose.
Instead, it is interested with how the many economic and political forces across a local political
system encouraged or discouraged EDC formation. Consequently, the study defines „local
political system‟ as the individual county.
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The model used in this study is composed of four sets of independent variables, each set
representing a general explanation for local boundary change:
New Economic Development Corporations = service demands + institutional
constraints upon local government + entrepreneurship + other local boundary changes.
Some 23 of North Dakota‟s 53 counties experienced the creation of at least one EDC between
1987 and 1992 while 21 counties saw at least one new EDC between 1992 and 1997. Likewise,
24 of South Dakota‟s 66 counties added at least one EDC between 1987 and 1992 while 15
counties had at least one new EDC form between 1992 and 1997. Given the number of counties
in both states receiving a score of „zero‟ on the dependent variables, the data used throughout
this study violates the normal distribution assumptions necessary for ordinary least squares
regression. The variances of the dependent variables are also larger than the means, which
implies an over-dispersed count variable. As a result, the study uses a negative binomial
distribution to examine its hypotheses.
Hypothesis One: The greater the demand for local services within a county, the greater
the number of new EDCs.
Counties experiencing economic and demographic change, whether positive or negative, will
have to deal with fresh demands by business people, property owners, and residents for
additional services. These forceful demands can be met through the existing network of local
governments or via the creation of additional cities and special districts (Bollens 196153; Wood
196154; Smith 196455). However, government incorporation is often a long process that does not
provide immediate relief to service demands (Burns 1994)56. As a result, there will be a general
incentive to maximize the contributions of the pre-existing governments in the hopes that this
will be sufficient until more long-term solutions are available. This incentive will lead to the
formation of new economic development corporations to assist in the provision of services.
Demand for additional services is represented by three independent variables: the first variable is
Population Growth by county, defined as the percent change in population from 1982 to 1987
and 1987 to 1992 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2001)57; the second variable is the Unemployment
rate per county in 1986 and 1992 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1996)58; and the third variable is
Percent Growth in Income, defined as the percent change in per capita personal income from
1982 to 1987 and 1987 to 1992 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2001)59.
Hypothesis Two: The greater the institutional constraints upon local government within a
county, the greater the number of new EDCs.
The proliferation of special districts during the post-war era was driven, in part, by the desire of
local politicians to circumvent state limits on local government operations (MacManus 198160;
Sbragia 199661). Counties and municipalities operating under statutes that limited their ability to
annex land, create new debt, or raise property taxes would often form special districts to serve as
8
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their proxies. This study examines counties within two neighboring states, though, so it would
seem that variations in state restrictions should not be much of an issue. However, both states
place strict limits on the extent to which municipalities, counties, and other local governments
can tax property (North Dakota Century Code 200762; South Dakota Codified Laws 200863).
Consequently, local politicians may try to circumvent these limits by encouraging the formation
of economic development corporations.
State constraints upon local governments is represented by Total Property Tax Revenues per
capita in 1987 and 1992 by county. These measures are derived from the 1987 and the 1997
Census of Governments (U.S. Bureau of the Census 199064; 199865).
Hypothesis Three: The greater the levels of local entrepreneurship within a county, the
greater the number of new EDCs.
The process of creating a new governmental organization can be expensive, risky, and timeconsuming (Burns 1994)66. Only entrepreneurial groups with considerable political and financial
resources are likely to see this process through to a successful conclusion (Feiock and Carr
2000)67. These groups do not expend their resources just to make slight adjustments to the local
political system, though. Instead, they seek a reconfiguration of the existing governing
arrangements to their own benefit. Burns (1994)68 identified private real-estate developers and
manufacturers as the most likely groups to push for boundary change. Her research indicates
that private developers call for the creation of special districts to provide services and
infrastructure for their properties while manufacturers help incorporate municipalities to keep tax
rates low. There is evidence that these groups maintain some influence over these governments
for many years after incorporation (Bauroth 2007)69.
The measure of local entrepreneurship used in this study is derived from the U.S. Bureau of
Census (2001)70: the Percentage of Local Earnings Derived from Finance, Insurance, and Real
Estate in 1987 and 1992 for each county. This measure is calculated by dividing Earnings in
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate with Total Earnings in All Industries.
Hypothesis Four: The greater the overall levels of boundary change within a county, the
greater the number of new EDCs.
Boundary change does not occur in isolation (Feiock and Carr 2001)71. Shared and overlapping
boundaries set the parameters for intergovernmental relationships so that one government‟s
decision to extend or retract its boundaries reverberates throughout the local political system.
Other governments may react by reconfiguring their own boundaries or otherwise enhancing
their power, which can lead to a transformation of the local political system (Perrenod 198472;
Burns 199473). Such a dynamic will lead to the creation of new EDCs as municipalities use all
available options in their ongoing strategy to improve their positions.
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Boundary change is represented through Change in the Number of Special Districts by county
from 1982 to 1987 and from 1987 to 1992. The definition of a special district used in this study
follows that of the U.S. Bureau of the Census:
special district governments are independent, special-purpose governmental units
(other than school district governments) that exist as separate entities with substantial
administrative and fiscal independence from general-purpose governments...In order
to be counted as a special district government, rather than be classified as a
subordinate agency, an entity must possess three attributes: existence as an organized
entity, governmental character, and substantial autonomy. (2002, vii)74.
The study uses Bureau‟s Census of Governments data to identify the number of special districts
in each county. It should be emphasized that the Bureau does not consider North Dakota or
South Dakota economic development corporations to be special districts (2002)75.
A primary difference between the two states is the presence of Job Development Authorities in
North Dakota. In 1985, the North Dakota legislature gave county governments the authorization
to levy a property tax of up to 4 mills for the purpose of encouraging job creation (North Dakota
Century Code 2008)76. However, the counties themselves do not maintain absolute control over
these revenues. Instead, a county seeking to levy such a tax must create a public agency called a
jobs development authority, or JDA, to oversee its dispersal. The intent of the legislature was to
create an agency that would “...assist rural communities to diversify their economic bases so the
communities would be less dependent on agriculture as the base of the communities‟ economies”
(North Dakota Legislative Council 2007, 2)77. The JDA would implement this policy, in part, by
entering into contracts with local economic development corporations. To account for this and
other statutory differences, a dummy measure for „North Dakota county is included in the model
as a control.
Finally, the study includes the number of municipalities within a county for 1987 and 1992. This
measure also serves as a control for local population.
Analysis
While the literature recognizes the general importance of quasi-governmental organizations for
state and local policy, empirical research is still quite limited. The first step for this study, then,
is to examine North Dakota and South Dakota on the relevant variables by county. It should be
emphasized that these figures are county means, not statewide averages. The results are
presented in Table 1.
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Table 1: Measures by North Dakota and South Dakota counties
ND Counties

SD Counties

6.90

4.85

12,474

10,546

Mean Percentage Population Growth, 1982-1987

-5.16

-2.89

Mean Percentage Population Growth, 1987-1992

-9.14

-2.69

Mean Percentage Growth in Income, 1982-1987

8.79

19.26

Mean Percentage Growth in Income, 1987-1992

7.78

13.07

Mean Percentage of Local Earnings Derived from Finance,

4.12

3.75

3.40

3.23

Mean Property Tax Revenues per capita, 1987 (1982 dollars)

364.11

427.47

Mean Property Tax Revenues per capita, 1992 (1982 dollars)

393.08

423.29

Mean Municipalities, 1987

6.91

4.68

Mean Municipalities, 1992

6.87

4.70

Mean Number of Special Districts, 1987

13.26

3.21

Mean Change in Number of Special Districts, 1982-1987

0.21

0.20

Mean Change in Number of Special Districts, 1987-1992

0.36

0.76

Mean New Economic Development Corporations, 1987-1992

0.60

0.48

Mean New Economic Development Corporations, 1992-1997

0.43

0.23

53

66

Mean Unemployment Rate, 1986
Mean Population, 1987

Insurance, and Real Estate, 1987
Mean Percentage of Local Earnings Derived from Finance,
Insurance, and Real Estate, 1992

Total Number of Counties

Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census (199478, 199879).
As can be seen, North Dakota counties had an average population that was approximately 20
percent larger than South Dakota counties. However, North Dakota counties were also
experiencing a more rapid decline in population. Both sets of counties underwent a sizable
growth in income, though it was greater in South Dakota. North Dakota counties tended to have
more municipalities and special districts, but were seeing smaller growth in their special district
numbers. South Dakota counties collected higher property tax revenues per capita, while a
greater portion of local earnings in North Dakota counties were derived from the finance,
insurance, and real estate industries. Finally, North Dakota counties had more economic
development corporations incorporate between 1992 and 1997 than South Dakota counties,
though both underwent mean growth.
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These measures indicate that the economic and demographic condition were fairly volatile in
both states during the period under study.
Having examined conditions at the county level, the model can now be employed to consider the
extent to which the four general explanations of local boundary change account for the uneven
distribution of new EDCs by county. The Negative Binomial Distribution results for 1987-1992
and 1992-1997 are found in Table 2.
Table 2: Explanations for the Creation of Economic Development Corporations in North
Dakota and South Dakota counties, using Negative Binomial distributions.

Percent Population Growth
Unemployment

New Economic Development

New Economic Development

Corporations, 1987-1992

Corporations, 1992-1997

2.2797

-0.3700

(2.6481)

(3.4963)

0.0459

-0.1486

(0.0644)

(0.0939)

-0.0015

2.8794 *

(1.0032)

(1.6097)

0.0028 ***

-0.0014

dollars)

(0.0011)

(0.0021)

Percent of Local Earnings Derived from

-4.2549

2.7981

Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate

(8.2257)

(11.9950)

Percent Growth in Income

Property Tax Revenues per capita (1982

Number of New Special Districts

0.3076 ***
(0.1053)

Number of Municipalities

0.0952 ***
(0.0296)

North Dakota dummy

Intercept
Dispersion
Scaled Deviance, Value/DF
Log Likelihood
N

(0.0960)
0.0519
(0.0398)

0.2508

0.8585 *

(0.3177)

(0.4754)

-2.6655 ***

-1.2421

(0.8551)

(1.1541)

-0.1946

-0.2069

(0.1975)

(0.2556)

1.0875

0.8431

-90.6840

-72.4642

119

119

* = .1; ** = .05; *** = .01 Coefficient / (Standard Error)
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The results indicate that the Unemployment Rate and Percent Population Growth did not have a
significant influence upon the dependent variables for either period. In addition, Percent Growth
in Income had a barely significant, positive relationship with the creation of new EDCs during
1992-1997. Consequently, there is little support for Hypothesis One. This implies that local
demands for additional services did not drive the creation of additional EDCs in North Dakota
and South Dakota during the 1980s and 1990s.
However, Property Tax per Capita had a very significant, positive impact upon the number of
new EDCs in 1987-1992. After controlling for the rest of the model, counties experiencing a
$100 increase in property taxes per capita will also see the creation of 0.11 more EDCs. This
result supports Hypothesis Two. Thus, the apparent need by local politicians to circumvent state
restrictions at the county level is associated with new EDCs. Property tax per capita proved
insignificant during 1992-1997, though.
The Percentage of Local Earnings Derived from Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate was
insignificant in both periods, which undercuts Hypothesis Three. Thus, the presence of
entrepreneurs with considerable resources and skills such as developers is not associated with
change in EDC numbers across the local political system.
The Boundary Change measures produced mixed results. Change in the Number of Special
Districts by county has a significant and positive association with the formation of EDCs for
1987-1992. Consequently, the addition of a single new special district is associated with the
creation of an additional 0.31 EDCs during this period. In addition, the number of municipalities
within a county has a significant impact for 1987-1992: each additional municipality within a
county is related to the formation of 0.095 new EDCs. These results provide some support for
Hypothesis Four: boundary change reverberates across the local political system and can bring
about additional instances of boundary changes, such as the formation of quasi-governmental
institutions. However, both variables proved insignificant for 1992-1997.
Finally, the North Dakota dummy variable was only significant during the period of 1992-1997.
Counties scoring „1‟ on this control measure experienced the creation of an additional 0.86
EDCs.
Conclusion
Shared and overlapping boundaries between local governments set the initial parameters for
intergovernmental relationships within a county or metropolitan area (Feiock and Carr 2001)80.
One government‟s decision to extend its boundaries is not a politically neutral event. Instead, it
often represents a significant projection of power and responsibilities (Perrenod 198481; Burns
199482). The literature provides four general explanations for the prevalence of local boundary
change: demographic and economic change produces strong demands for additional services;
state statutory limits upon local government behavior forces local politicians into circumventing
these statutes; resourceful public and private entrepreneurs instigate boundary change for their
13
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own advantage; and, a single instance of boundary change can reverberate throughout the local
political system and bring about further boundary changes. This study examined the ability of
these explanations to account for the uneven proliferation of economic development corporations
across North Dakota and South Dakota by county.
Some important conclusions can be derived from the analysis. First, unemployment and
population growth had no impact upon the creation of economic development corporations.
These results suggest that the creation and use of such quasi-governmental entities in North
Dakota and South Dakota was not driven by in local service demands.
Second, state constraints upon local government in terms of property taxes do affect the creation
of additional EDCs. It appears that the proliferation of EDCs was driven at least in part by a
desire to circumvent state statutes.
Third, the relative economic strength of finance, insurance, and real estate establishments has no
impact upon EDC formation, at least in these two states.
Finally, boundary change does not appear to occur in isolation. The presence of many
municipalities as well as the formation of an increasing number of special districts within a
county encourages the further proliferation of EDCs, even after controlling for other relevant
variables. This finding indicates that the instability caused by such boundary change
reverberates throughout the local political system.
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